Why do armed groups ever direct violent attacks against humanitarian aid organizations? While a growing literature has developed on wartime violence against civilians, little research has been done on violence directed against humanitarian aid organizations. And yet violence against aid workers is common in wartime; furthermore, these attacks have particularly devastating consequences for civilians, who suffer when aid organizations are unable or unwilling to provide services as a result of attacks. This paper argues that much of the violence directed against humanitarian aid organizations is not random, but a strategic response aimed at controlling the civilian population. Aid organizations provide essential supplies and services to civilians, reducing the civilian population's dependence on armed groups for their welfare and, therefore, also reducing the ability of armed groups to control civilians. Armed groups thus target aid organizations as a means of pushing aid organizations out of the region in an effort to retain control over the provision of services and to retain authority over civilians themselves. This paper tests this argument in the case of Afghanistan using an original dataset of all reported attacks against aid workers over the last five years of combat operations in Afghanistan.
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Introduction
In June 2004 in the Badghis province of Afghanistan, Taliban forces ambushed a vehicle bearing the logo of the humanitarian organization, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), killing five MSF employees, including three foreigners and two Afghans.
1 Nothing was stolen from the vehicle. At the time, Badghis did not have a significant United States or international troop presence and according to MSF coordinators, "Badghis was for us considered the safest place to work." 2 The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. Following the June 2004 attack, MSF suspended all operations in Afghanistan; 4 around the same time, the United Nations suspended its activities in Badghis. 5 In explaining the withdrawal, the head of the MSF mission noted that, "While the security situation has deteriorated over the last year, what is a new feature is this targeting issue which has never happened before in Afghanistan and this is what makes us take the situation so seriously we felt we have to withdraw." 6 Violent attacks against humanitarian aid workers are common in wartime (Sheik, Gutierrez, Bolton, Spiegel, Thieren, and Burnham 2000; Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006; Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico 2009; Fast 2013a, 2013b) . Afghanistan is no exception, with frequent attacks against aid workers occurring throughout the past decade. 7 From 2001 to 2010, Afghanistan was the third largest recipient of humanitarian aid, receiving more than US$5 billion (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2012:30) , while total foreign aid, including both humanitarian and development assistance, exceeded US$36 billion. provide assistance based on need alone, without taking sides in the conflict (Anderson 1999) . And yet, if aid organizations are providing essential assistance to civilians in need while remaining neutral in the conflict, what explains why armed groups frequently attack them?
These attacks are puzzling because when combatants direct violence against aid workers, aid organizations often decide to suspend their operations, as MSF did in Afghanistan, thereby denying the local civilian population access to aid provisions altogether. The civilians who suffer when aid organizations withdraw are often the very same civilians on whose behalf insurgents claim to fight, and upon whom they depend to supply resources and recruits (Kalyvas 2006) . Undermining the provision of aid thus risks undermining the base of civilian support for the insurgency.
One of the most common explanations for why armed groups direct violence against aid workers is that during wartime, the rule of law is weak, allowing individuals to engage in looting and robbery. Aid organizations are particularly tempting targets for attack, as they often disburse significant resources, such as food, medical and communication equipment, and even cash. In their study of worldwide violence against aid workers, Stoddard et al. (2006) note that although some portion of this violence is motivated by a desire to steal resources, in many more cases -like the June 2004 ambush of the MSF vehicle -attacks on aid workers do not involve looting or robbery.
We argue that much of the violence against aid workers during wartime is strategic and politically motivated. Despite attempts by aid organizations to remain neutral and impartial during conflict, their presence can affect the relationships between insurgents, counterinsurgents, and civilians in important ways. The services aid organizations provide are often the very same services that the government is obliged to provide under its social contract with its citizens. By serving as substitute providers of public goods aid organizations can bolster the strength of the government, thereby decreasing the incentives for civilians to support insurgents. With their connection to civilians under threat, insurgents target aid workers as a means of forcing them out of particular 3 ! regions in an effort to undermine support for the government. We thus posit that violence against aid workers is likely to be higher in regions where support for the government is higher, as armed groups seek to challenge the government's control over these regions.
The paper begins with a discussion of the scholarly literature on wartime violence against noncombatants, which has focused primarily on violence against civilians. We argue that simply extending theories of civilian abuse to explain violence against another noncombatant group -in this case, aid workers -is problematic. In the second section, we develop our main argument, positing that armed groups use violence against aid workers as a tool for undermining government control in particular regions. In the second half of the paper, we test this argument statistically using an original dataset describing violence against aid workers in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2012.
Looking across provinces in Afghanistan, we find evidence consistent with our argument; attacks against aid workers are systematically higher where support for the government is higher. However, despite our initial expectation that attacks would increase linearly as a function of civilian support for the government, we find evidence of a curvilinear relationship. Attacks against aid workers appear to be concentrated in more marginal provinces where civilian support for the government is neither exceedingly high nor exceedingly low. We also find evidence that the strategic logic of targeting aid workers holds strongly for attacks against international aid workers but not national Afghan aid workers. While initially unexpected, we offer an interpretation of these findings in the results section that is remarkably consistent with the logic of strategic targeting These findings contribute to an emerging area of research on civil war -examining the impact of humanitarian aid on the dynamics of violence. Several recent studies have convincingly demonstrated that the presence of aid affects insurgent incentives for violence against civilians (Weintraub 2015; Wood and Sullivan 2015) . As we show in this paper, however, by altering the relationship between insurgents and civilians, the presence of aid can also lead to increased violence 4 ! against aid workers themselves. While several policy-oriented studies have examined violence against aid workers, only a few rigorous, empirically grounded analyses of the causes of such violence exist. Fast (2014) , in her comprehensive qualitative study of attacks against aid workers, and Murdie and Stapley (2014) , in their cross-national study of terrorist violence against aid workers, have persuasively demonstrated the ways in which aid can become politicized, creating incentives for violence. Here, we offer an analysis of the strategic incentives for violence using sub-national data on Afghanistan, which allows us to hold constant a variety of factors that otherwise might contribute to violence against aid organizations.
Violence against Noncombatants in Civil War
The literature on wartime violence against civilians provides a starting point for understanding violence against aid workers. Civilians, as well as aid workers, are considered noncombatants -individuals who are not actively involved in military operations under international humanitarian law and thus are protected against violence (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005) .
Scholars have made a number of different arguments about when and why armed groups nevertheless engage in violence against noncombatants. One strand of argument emphasizes organizational dynamics, claiming that violence is more likely when armed groups are unable to effectively control their members, leading to looting and opportunistic violence against civilians (Azam 2006; Wood 2006; Weinstein 2007; Hoover Green 2011; Manekin 2013) . Some have argued that problems of organizational control are pervasive among armed groups that have access to external resources. These resources attract low-commitment recruits motivated by short-term rewards and who are thus prone to discipline problems, leading to unsanctioned violence (Weinstein 2007 ).
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In Afghanistan, the Taliban does rely on opium production to fund its activities (Maloney 2009 (Maloney , 2010 Thruelsen 2010) , and it is possible that this has exacerbated problems of organizational control. However, it is difficult to sustain the claim that this accounts for most violence against aid workers. In fact, the data from Afghanistan show that only about 20 percent of attacks against aid workers involved theft; the vast majority of attacks are designed to deliberately injure or kill aid workers.
A second strand of argument posits that violence against civilians may serve as a strategic means of controlling civilians and thereby territory (Kalyvas 2006) . By using violence to punish individuals suspected of aiding the opponent, armed groups can coerce civilians into cooperating and deter other civilians from providing resources and intelligence to the opponent. Some argue that this type of violence is most likely when contestation over territory is high, as belligerents attempt to convince civilians that aiding the other side will be costly (Kalyvas 1999) . Others contend that because militarily weak armed groups have difficulty securing voluntary support from civilians, they often resort to coercive violence to obtain resources, leading to increased violence against civilians (Wood 2010 (Wood , 2014a (Wood , 2014b Wood, Kathman, and Gent 2012) .
Extending these arguments to explain violence against aid workers, however, is problematic.
As discussed, most aid organizations strive to maintain neutrality and impartiality. And although these principles may sometimes be compromised under challenging wartime circumstances, aid workers are unlikely to be as vulnerable to coercion as civilians. Aid workers often suspend operations in areas of high contestation, insulating them from attempts at coercion.
Other strategic theories posit that governments and rebel groups may attack their opponent's civilian constituents in an attempt to increase the costs of the conflict, thus pressuring their opponent to make concessions. Some contend that governments and armed groups that are weak militarily (Crenshaw 1998; Pape 2003; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004) or groups 6 ! that are losing the war (Hultman 2007 (Hultman , 2012 Downes 2008 ) are more likely to use this strategy.
Others argue that armed groups also consider their opponent's perceived sensitivity to civilian losses (Stanton 2013) .
Again, although these arguments help to explain deliberate attacks on an opponent's civilian constituency, it is unlikely that this logic provides a complete explanation for violence against aid workers. While it is true that many governments benefit from the presence of aid workers as substitute providers of basic services, aid organizations are not political constituents. Because aid workers lack representation in the domestic political process, it is not clear that governments would be nearly as sensitive to attacks on aid workers.
In sum, despite a rich literature on wartime violence against civilians, few studies have attempted to explain violence against other noncombatants, such as aid workers.
9 Media sources, in contrast, have reported extensively on violence against aid workers, and several policy-oriented reports have examined cross-national trends (King 2002; Stoddard et al. 2006 Stoddard et al. , 2009 Fast 2013a, 2013b) . As Fast points out, however, research on this topic has largely taken a descriptive approach, reporting the numbers of deaths rather than evaluating hypotheses regarding the causes of violence (Fast 2010) . Meanwhile, the few policy-oriented reports that have suggested possible causes of violence against aid workers (Stoddard et al. 2006 (Stoddard et al. , 2009 ) still lack systematic empirical evidence to support these strategic claims (Fast 2010) .
Several scholars, however, have begun to address this gap in the literature. In perhaps the most comprehensive study of violence against aid workers to date, Fast argues that aid organizations often have "internal vulnerabilities" that increase the likelihood of violence; for example, aid organizations may behave in ways that increase perceptions that they are biased toward one side in the conflict (Fast 2014) . Fast also acknowledges the importance of the external environment, arguing (Mitchell 2015) . Similarly, Murdie and Stapley (2014) argue that politicization of the NGO sector is likely when human rights NGOs are engaged in political advocacy work. The political message of human rights NGOs may draw support away from insurgents, increasing incentives for insurgents to use terrorist violence against the NGO sector. As we demonstrate in the next section, however, even the presence of avowedly apolitical and neutral humanitarian aid organizations can alter the relationship between insurgents and civilians, creating incentives for violence.
A Theory of Violence against Aid Workers
Following the literature on civil wars and counterinsurgency, we begin with the assumption that controlling the civilian population is often a central objective for both insurgent and government forces (e.g., Lawrence 1929; Mao 1961; Kalyvas 2006) . Building from this, we argue that the presence of aid organizations can complicate the interaction between the government, insurgents, and civilians. Although aid organizations may try to remain neutral and impartial, the services they provide are oftentimes the very same services that the government would provide under normal circumstances (Stoddard 2003; Macrae and Harmer 2004; Donini 2007; Weintraub 2015; Wood and Sullivan 2015) . In relieving some of the pressure on the government to provide public goods, humanitarian and development aid can thus help the government to maintain popular support at the local level. In fact, in some cases, governments may even divert aid towards their own political constituents as a means of maintaining key sources of support (e.g., Harvey and Lind 2005) .
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Relieved of some of the financial burden of providing public goods, the government may be able to direct scarce resources to counterinsurgency operations and other government programs, thus helping to maintain popular support at the national level as well. Therefore, by decreasing the domestic political costs of sustaining a costly war effort, aid provisions can effectively increase the resolve of the government while decreasing the incentives for civilians to back insurgents.
To be sure, rebel groups also establish governance structures in many conflicts, providing public services in territories they control (Mampilly 2011; Arjona 2014) . In these areas, insurgents may also coopt humanitarian assistance to enhance their own governance (Mampilly 2011) . When cooptation is possible, insurgents likely have few incentives to undermine the provision of aid.
However, in Afghanistan, the Taliban has had difficulty using humanitarian aid to its advantage because -as the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) reports -few aid organizations are willing to abide by Taliban regulations (Jackson and Giustozzi 2012) .
There is substantial qualitative evidence to support the assumption that humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan benefits the government more so than the insurgency. For example, Terry (2011) observed that, after the Taliban government was overthrown in late 2001, "the overwhelming majority [of aid organizations] embraced a role in 'post-conflict' reconstruction and development efforts, and joined the political project to extend the government's legitimacy throughout the country" (176). In addition, Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov (2011) , found that village participation in development assistance programs in Afghanistan is associated with the perception of greater economic well-being and more positive attitudes toward the government. Furthermore, evidence from a recent HPG study examining Taliban perceptions of humanitarian aid indicates that many Taliban members are concerned that humanitarian aid will benefit the government, both by contributing resources to the government and by providing intelligence about insurgent activities (Jackson and Giustozzi 2012) . Indeed, the HPG study noted that Taliban members frequently cite 9 ! concerns that aid agencies are working on behalf of foreign forces (Terry 2011; Jackson and Giustozzi 2012) .
Based on these accounts, it is thus likely that armed groups frequently target aid organizations as a means of pushing them out of particular regions (or out of the country entirely), in an effort to undermine support for the government. Indeed, insurgent groups are well aware that attacks on aid workers may lead aid organizations to withdraw their humanitarian assistance altogether, inflicting severe costs on the civilian population -and, in turn, the government -in the form of lost access to basic services. By strategically directing violence against aid workers in provinces where civilian support for the government is high, armed groups aim to undermine public goods provision and thereby undermine the government's control over these territories.
At the same time, the withdrawal of humanitarian aid may also bring costs for insurgents.
Civilians might blame insurgents for the decline in access to aid, and when aid organizations depart, insurgents have fewer opportunities to siphon off resources. Thus, concentrating attacks in areas of higher government support may also minimize the costs to insurgents, as civilian support for insurgents is already lower in these regions. In regions where civilian support for insurgents is higher, insurgents are less likely to be willing to risk alienating their own supporters by driving away humanitarian assistance. Moreover, where support for insurgents is extremely high, insurgents may even exert significant control over aid activities, further limiting the need to attack aid organizations.
This general logic of violence helps to explain why armed groups have more frequently targeted aid workers in Afghanistan relative to other conflicts. Although many aid organizations have tried to distance themselves from the government's counterinsurgency operations, maintaining this separation has proven difficult for a number of reasons. First, because the Afghan government is administratively weak (Sullivan 2007; Angstrom 2008; Jones 2008) , aid organizations have been forced to fill gaps in government services, which has effectively helped the government remain in ! power.
10 Second, many of the aid organizations in Afghanistan, such as MSF and Save the Children, have origins in countries contributing troops to coalition forces defending the government, making it difficult to appear neutral (Donini, Fast, Hansen, Harris, Minear, Mowjee, et al. 2008; Donini 2009 Donini , 2010 Stoddard et al. 2009 ). As a Taliban spokesman noted in 2008, "The UN was established to ensure the rights of nations, but now this organization supports one side in Afghanistan and wants to eliminate the other side" (quoted in Donini et al. 2008:10) . Third, the U.S. government has been heavily involved in the provision of aid to Afghanistan, forming an apparent association between the government coalition and aid organizations (Rieff 2002) . Indeed, the U.S. has stated that it views the provision of humanitarian aid through PRTs as crucial to the success of rebuilding the Afghan state, with Colin Powell stating publically that "the NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team" (quoted in Rieff 2002:236) .
For these reasons, insurgent groups largely perceive aid organizations as bolstering civilian support for the Afghan government, and thereby its overall strength relative to the insurgency. A senior Afghan official described this logic plainly: "aid agencies are being targeted because they deliver services for the government. NGOs increase the legitimacy of the government. The insurgents are not attacking the NGOs, they are attacking the government" (quoted in Donini 2006:31) . Interviews with Taliban members, conducted by the HPG, indicate that they also view aid as increasing support for the government. One Taliban commander is quoted as saying "when we became convinced that our support for them [aid agencies] resulted in benefits for the current government and Americans, we started opposing them" (quoted in Jackson and Giustozzi 2012:24) .
Another Taliban commander offered a similar explanation for opposition to aid organizations, saying, "when our leaders recognized that those [aid] activities were aimed to benefit the
government and the foreigners, they issued orders to ban them so we blocked their activities with a single call" (quoted in Jackson and Giustozzi 2012:25) .
In line with anecdotal evidence, it is reasonable to hypothesize that armed groups systematically use violence to coerce aid workers into withdrawing or suspending their services as part of a larger strategy to undermine support for the Afghan government. Indeed, this would be consistent with recent studies that have shown insurgent groups can obtain strategic benefits from targeting of noncombatants more generally (Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014) . If this argument is correct, attacks on aid workers should be more likely to occur in areas where civilian support for the government is higher, because it is in these regions that insurgents stand to gain the most. Conversely, we should expect attacks on aid workers to be least likely in areas where civilian support for the government is lowest, because the return on investment from an attack is likely to be comparatively low. Additionally, in areas where government support is already low, attacks will be further suppressed because rebels may directly gain from aid provisions through looting (Wood and Sullivan 2015) or through greater control over distribution (Terry 2002) . This is in fact fully consistent with the HPG report, which noted that, in some regions of Afghanistan, the security environment for aid organizations was not as risky because "the Taliban had consolidated control over the villages and were less concerned about aid activities benefitting the Kabul government." (Jackson and Giustozzi 2012:21) Hypothesis: the greater the civilian support for the government in a particular region, the more likely it is that armed opposition groups will attack aid organizations in that region.
Our argument is similar to previous work by Balcells (2010 Balcells ( , 2011 , which convincingly links variation in civil war violence to prior electoral support across rival factions. Like Balcells, we posit that civilians' "public identities" affect the strategic incentives of armed groups to utilize violence across localities. Our theory is also consistent with recent research by Weintraub (2015) and Wood and Sullivan (2015) , linking foreign aid to patterns of insurgent violence in civil war. Weintraub ! shows that governments' tendency to provide aid where they have territorial control can incentivize civilians to share information with the government, increasing incumbent territorial control, and thereby forcing insurgents to rely on indiscriminate violence to recapture territory. Here, we highlight the possibility that insurgents may simply target aid organizations to undermine government control. Wood and Sullivan posit that greater inflows of humanitarian aid in conflict zones, by increasing access to lootable resources and threatening rebel authority, can increase incentives for rebel group violence against civilians. We agree that rebel groups often perceive aid as undermining their relationship with civilians, but argue that this may lead not only to increased violence against civilians, but also to increased violence against aid workers. Furthermore, we contend that attacks will vary across space and time within countries, as insurgents direct violence toward areas of greatest support for the government in an effort to deny the government and its supporters access to aid.
The logic of our argument notwithstanding, we acknowledge two potential limitations. First, although we emphasize factors that influence the willingness of insurgents to attack aid workers, many scholars have argued that the opportunity to commit violence is also important. For example, insurgents may be more likely to attack aid caravans when they are not well defended or in the more permissive summer months (Fast 2014) , or where more developed infrastructure gives humanitarian organizations better access to victims. We recognize these risk factors as important, and below, we attempt to control for several "opportunity" factors that might confound the hypothesized relationship between support for the government and attacks against aid workers.
Second, we argue that insurgents deliberately attack aid workers in areas of high government support to reduce access to aid in these areas, thus harming the government and its constituents. It is possible, however, that insurgents are simultaneously motivated to attack aid workers for informational reasons similar to those influencing attacks against civilians (Kalyvas 2006) . If aid is ! more likely to flow to areas where the government exerts greater control, attacks against aid workers may be more likely simply because rebels know less about activities in these areas, and have difficulty identifying which aid organizations are most closely allied to the government. While it is possible that this alternative mechanism is occurring alongside our hypothesized mechanism, the first-hand accounts of combatants and agencies on the ground quoted above provide evidence that attacks are orchestrated when and where aid workers are perceived to increase support for the government.
Research Design
In this section, we examine the empirical relationship between civilian support for the government and attacks against aid workers across province-year observations in Afghanistan.
Data
For data on our dependent variable -the average monthly number of attacks against aid workerswe compiled an original dataset based on newly released statistics from the Afghan National Security 
, and 2011), we divided the total number of attacks by the number of months in that year to calculate the average number of attacks per month in each province-year under observation as our dependent variable.
In total, the dataset contains information on 691 unique attacks against aid workers resulting in roughly 936 victims (often, several aid workers are affected in a single attack).
12 Although some of these victims were neither injured nor killed, many were: 119 victims were killed, 148 were injured but not killed, and 475 were kidnapped and eventually released. While kidnappings represent the largest number of victims by category, they are relatively uncommon events with respect to the total number of attacks. Indeed, 513 (74%) of the attacks did not involve an abduction.
For each attack, we record (i) the date; (ii) the physical location at the province-level and the district-level when available; (iii) the type of NGO targeted, including its mission (demining, education, healthcare, etc.) and whether it was a national or international NGO; (iv) the affiliation of the 16 Thus, while much of the variation in the measure is cross-sectional, the over-time variation across the two time points allows us to estimate an average difference across provinces and account for some of the temporal variation in the dependent variable. Appendix Figure A1 provides a map plotting the distribution of our key explanatory variable. Below, we discuss some limitations of these data and propose several solutions. For the most part, the revised October 19 election results did not alter outcomes at the provincial level. Nevertheless, we take allegations of fraud seriously, as it could threaten the validity of Karzai vote share as a reliable measure of government support. We thus run our analyses using both sets of results -the preliminary results released on September 16 (Table 2 ) and the final results released on October 19 (Appendix Table A4 ) -and our findings remain consistent. We also run robustness checks in which we drop the provinces alleged to have the greatest incidence of fraud, according to data from Weidmann and Callen (2013) . Weidmann and Callen find that in 14 of the 389 districts (3.6 percent), fraud benefited both candidates, while in 58 districts (14.9 percent) fraud benefited Karzai, and in 66 districts (17.0 percent) fraud benefited Abdullah. These problematic districts are spread throughout Afghanistan, with the majority of provinces having at least one district showing evidence of fraud. For this reason, we do not find irregularities at the district level to have a significant impact on our province-level measure. However, in three provincesKandahar, Paktika and Nangarhar -the majority of districts have indications of electoral fraud in favor of Karzai. To address this, we run robustness tests in which we drop these three provinces from the analysis; doing so does not significantly alter our results (Appendix Table A5 ).
Variation in electoral support for Karzai is not a perfect measure of the level of support for the government. However, at present, no preferable alternatives exit. One limitation of the measure is the time-gap between our measurement of the treatment (civilian support) and the outcome ! (attacks). A second limitation is that it may also track the level of government control across provinces, which is perhaps a separate mechanism from support for the government. Finally, we acknowledge that a vote for a competitor to Karzai does not necessarily mean that the civilian population in that province supported armed opposition groups. However, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the provinces in which a higher percentage of the population voted for Karzai generally exhibit higher levels of support for the government compared to provinces in which Karzai's vote share was considerably lower. As Steele (2011) Lyall (2013, 2014) have argued that civilian attitudes in Afghanistan ought to be measured at the more micro-level (village or individual), publicly disseminated information on civilian attitudes is often aggregated up to the level of the province. This should, in turn, lead to distinct patterns in violence across provinces.
17 Therefore, we expect that as the percentage of the vote share for Karzai increases across provinces, the more likely armed groups will be to use violence to coerce aid workers into withdrawing.
These points notwithstanding, to probe the validity of Karzai Vote Share as a measure of support for the government, in the results section we examine alternative measures, including the percentage of the population that turned out to vote in the election, and survey data from the Asia 
Control Variables
In the analysis below, we use a combination of control variables, described in Appendix Table A1 , to account for the fact that our independent variables may not be 'randomly assigned' across Afghan provinces. For example, it is possible that overall levels of violence are simply higher in provinces in which the government enjoys greater civilian support, in which case, aid workers may be incidentally caught in the cross-fire more often, rather than deliberately targeted as our strategic logic implies. Similarly, provinces in which support for the government is high may also be provinces in which aid workers are granted greater access to civilians (suggesting a higher propensity to be treated), in which case any increased risk of an attack against aid workers may be an artifact of a greater absolute number of aid workers on the ground rather than the strategic incentives we posit.
One way to limit the risk of endogenous selection would be to run a two-stage model to recover some exogenous component of government support; however, this is difficult to implement given our small sample size. Instead, we include factors that may increase the overall likelihood of an aid worker attack as controls.
First, we included a measure for the Overall Level of Violence using the Worldwide Incidents
Tracking System (WITS), the U.S. government's statistical database on acts of terrorism and political violence. 18 We constructed this measure by aggregating violent events from WITS into two separate indicators: one that sums all violent events, and another that excludes attacks against aid workers.
18 While it would be ideal to control for violence against civilians, province-level data on this are not available for the time period we examine. ACLED identifies incidents of "violence against civilians" at the province level, but attacks against aid workers are included in this category. As Hirose, Imai, and Lyall (2014) note, the data from iMMAP are noisy and suffer from a clear under-reporting problem, yielding far fewer recorded instances of violence than other sources. 19 The results are robust to both measures.
21 ! WITS provides information on the location of each incident, allowing for the creation of a provincelevel measure of violence.
As a robustness check, we also utilized three alternative measurements for the overall intensity of violence in Afghanistan from the Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED), the Joint Operations-INTEL Information System (JOIIS) database, and the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database (Berman, Callen, Felter, and Shapiro 2011) . In all cases we aggregate to the province-year level to match voting data. In the main tables, we report results using the WITS measurement of overall violence, because it is available for the full time period of our data set. Tables A6, A7 , and A8, respectively). This is because the three measures of violence are highly correlated over the observations for which we have data, as shown in Appendix Table A2 . In Appendix Table A9 we also control for violence against ISAF troops. This analysis also provides evidence that the relationship between support for the government and attacks is not purely driven by antagonism towards the "Western" nature of aid organizations or the U.S. and its allies. Second, we use several different means of controlling for the number of aid workers present in each province, to address the possibility that insurgents may have greater opportunity to attack aid workers in provinces with a greater aid worker presence. An ideal way to address this concern would be to measure our dependent variable as the per-capita rate of aid worker attacks. Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly measure the number of aid workers on the ground in a particular provinceyear (Benelli, Donini, and Niland 2012) . However, in the absence of these data, we control for the 
Results
Table 1 reports the regression results for our central hypothesis using an OLS regression with fixed effects by province to control for heterogeneity in unobserved characteristics that may influence the predictor variables. 25 This is important because our relatively simple model specifications almost certainly exclude latent variation across provinces that could bias our estimates.
In particular, it is possible that attacks against aid workers are a function of the local security environment, whereby aid workers can only enter the most permissive provinces (which may be controlled by the Karzai government), and thus they are simply attacked in the provinces where they are located. We find little evidence for this form of selection bias: the correlation coefficient between the intensity of violence and the presence of aid workers is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the estimates below measure the impact of each variable within each province over time and average those coefficients across each of the 34 provinces in case there are time-invariant characteristics (e.g., terrain) that affect access across provinces. 26 In addition, given limited temporal variation in the available electoral data, and given that fixed effects can suppress some of the cross-sectional variation, we also analyze the data using a negative binomial model and a Poisson model without fixed effects. However, because our dependent variable measures the average monthly number of attacks in each province-year, rather than the total number of attacks, count models are unlikely to be the best fit for the data structure; nevertheless, our results are robust to these models. Sheik et al. (2000) report that aid organizations usually employ a ratio of foreign to local staff of 7:1 or 8:1. 25 To confirm that the time-invariant characteristics are unique to the individual province, and not correlated with the error term and constant of other provinces, we ran a Hausman test to reject the null hypothesis that the preferred model is random effects (Greene 2008:chapter 9) . 26 We also control for the level of violence across provinces. This non-linear relationship -intuitive as it is -was not our original theoretical expectation.
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Nevertheless, the finding makes sense, and it perhaps should have been our theoretical prior from the outset. Indeed, if insurgents are rational, then it would seem that the greatest potential return on investment should come from targeting provinces where civilian support for the government is neither exceedingly high nor exceedingly low. Similar to campaigning in domestic political elections, marginal provinces should be more "ripe" to swing in the opposition's favor per unit of effort. In provinces with very high levels of support for Karzai, it would take a prohibitively large campaign of violence to undermine the government; while in provinces with extremely low levels of support for Karzai, insurgents may be able to coopt aid organizations, reducing the need for violence.
Remarkably, insurgents appear to concentrate attacks at the optimal point in the cost-curve.
With respect to the control variables in the main analysis, perhaps unsurprisingly, the rate of attacks against aid workers is positively correlated with both the overall intensity of violence (Narang 2012) and with the overall size of the aid effort on the ground. Finally, aid workers appear to be more vulnerable to attacks in highly populated provinces, perhaps because they represent more pivotal pieces in the competition between armed groups and the state. ! We also run a series of additional tests to probe the robustness of the results. Appendix Tables A10 and A11 show that the results are robust when using a simple negative binomial model and a Poisson model. In Appendix Table A12 , we address the possibility that support for the government may be partly endogenous to attacks against aid workers by utilizing a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method as described by Terza et al. (2008) and implemented by Findley & Young (2011) and Azam & Delacroix (2006) . We find that the coefficient estimate for our main independent variable remains the same.
In Appendix Table A13 Table A14 , we show that the results are robust to the inclusion of factors that proxy for the opportunity to attack aid workers, including Road Coverage and Bridges, which together affect access across provinces. While it is still possible that the opportunity to attack is correlated with the willingness to attack aid workers, the virtually unchanged coefficient for support for the Karzai government suggests that at least some portion of this "willingness" is orthogonal to the opportunity to attack, and can thus be estimated as an independent risk factor. In Appendix Table A15 , we show that the results are robust to the inclusion of controls for foreign military presence -proxied by the location of ISAF military installments across provinces over time -which previous studies have shown to be correlated with suicide violence (Pape 2003) , and may also be correlated with the activities of aid workers. Finally, Appendix Table A16 shows that the results are robust to the inclusion of controls for the ethnic composition of provinces over time -proxied by the percentage Pashtun -since previous work has found political violence in Afghanistan to be concentrated in majority Pashtun areas (Berman, et al. 29 ! 2011) . The results suggest that the relationship between support for the government and attacks against aid workers is not entirely driven by the ethnic differences underlying the broader conflict. Table 2 investigates whether the same logic applies to attacks against National (Models 1-3) versus International aid organizations (Models 4-6). According to our data, 400 incidents involved attacks against national organizations, while 274 incidents involved attacks against international organizations.
27 Interestingly, we find that while support for the government is associated with a greater likelihood of attacks against international aid organizations, it is not strongly associated with the likelihood of attacks against Afghan aid organizations. Although we initially held no prior expectations for a heterogeneous treatment effects across the two groups, this finding is consistent with the logic of our theoretical argument. We posited that armed groups attack aid organizations in an effort to push them out of regions where support for the government is high. International aid organizations can, and often do, pull out of dangerous areas or even suspend operations in a particular country, as MSF did in Afghanistan. Afghan organizations, however, do not have the same options to withdraw from the country. The fact that support for the government influences attacks against international but not national aid workers suggests that combatants only expect attacks against the former to reduce the provision of services, thus undermining support for the government.
28
In theory, one might suppose that national organizations could relocate their operations to other provinces in Afghanistan. However, most Afghan aid organizations do not have national reach, as their small staff and lack of resources generally limit their operations. Indeed, a 2012 report detailing the operations and geographic coverage of all registered Afghan NGOs showed that only
27 National and International aid worker attacks are positively correlated (p<0.05) across provinces (0.78) and time (0.43). 28 In addition, the higher absolute number of attacks against national aid workers suggests that attacks are not simply driven by a desire to force "international interveners" to leave. If this were true, insurgents would have little incentive to attack national aid workers at all, let alone at a higher rate.
30 ! 6.5 percent of the 306 active Afghan NGOs operate in more than five provinces; while more than 40 percent operate in only one province or city (Counterpart International 2012). As such, Afghan aid organizations are typically attached to the localities in which operate. Afghanistan as an example and arguing that responses to sensitive questions -particularly questions regarding support for the warring parties -are likely to be biased (Lyall et al. 2013; Blair et al. 2014 ).
!
Furthermore, many of the relevant survey questions were not asked every year the Asia Foundation survey was taken. Despite these concerns, the data offer a means of testing whether our hypothesized relationship holds using an annual measure of support across provinces. Table 3 re-estimates our results using the annual data from the Asia Foundation, drawn from two key survey questions. Model 1 measures the level of support for the government using the percentage of citizens who -when asked to think about the economy -did not respond they were less prosperous now when compared to life under the Taliban government. Model 2 measures the level of support for the government using the percentage of respondents who responded "somewhat good job" to the question: "thinking of the National/ Central Government, how do you ! feel about the way it is carrying out its responsibilities." Due to data limitations from the Asia Foundation after 2010, we estimate both sets of models on the data from [2008] [2009] . As the results indicate, the direction and magnitude of the effect are in line with our hypothesis: as the level of support for the Karzai government increases across provinces, the average rate of attacks against aid workers increases. We caution, however, that both sets of results miss statistical significance due to the small sample size. 
Conclusion
Why do armed groups direct violent attacks against humanitarian aid organizations? Despite the fact that most humanitarian aid missions are obligated under the Geneva Conventions to remain politically neutral in providing basic human needs, humanitarian aid workers are frequently the targets of violent attacks. This is particularly true in Afghanistan where from April 2008 to December 2012 there were nearly 700 documented attacks against aid workers. These attacks are puzzling because, if aid provisions are suspended, not only do armed groups lose access to future aid provisions themselves, they also risk undermining their base of support among the local civilian population.
In this paper, we proposed a theory to explain variation in attacks against aid workers across provinces in Afghanistan. As the literature on civil wars and counterinsurgency demonstrates, controlling the civilian population is often a central objective for both insurgent and government forces. In this context, by providing public goods, aid organizations can increase support for the government at both the local and national level, thus helping the government to maintain power.
Thus, we posited that armed groups often target aid organizations as a means of pushing them out of particular regions to undermine support for the government.
Consistent with this logic, we found significant empirical evidence that armed groups direct violence against aid workers in provinces where civilian support for the government is higher. Using a newly compiled panel dataset on attacks against aid workers across all 34 provinces of Afghanistan from April 2008 to December 2012, we demonstrate that the intensity of attacks increases with the level of political support for the incumbent Karzai government. Indeed, the data suggest that the estimated average number of attacks per month increases roughly 75 percent when moving from the lowest percentile of Karzai vote share to the highest percentile. We also found that insurgents appear to have greater incentives to concentrate attacks in more marginal provinces, where 35 ! undermining support for the government could swing a province in insurgents' favor. Furthermore, support for the government is associated with a greater likelihood of attacks against international aid organizations but not national aid organizations. This is likely because international organizations have demonstrated a consistent willingness to withdraw services in response to attacks. National Afghan organizations, by contrast, tend to have smaller scale operations with limited geographic scope and function by building close relationships within the communities they serve, reducing the likelihood that they will respond to violence by relocating.
These results have important implications for how scholars and practitioners understand humanitarianism in conflict and post-conflict areas. For scholars, we show that the logic of violence against noncombatants may differ from one type of non-combatant to another. Indeed, we suggest that the relationship between aid workers and armed groups may be much different in character than the relationship between civilians and armed groups. While recent research has shed considerable light on the factors driving violence against civilians in civil war, we show that many of the observable implications of these theories are not fully consistent with violence against aid workers. Rather, humanitarian aid workers represent a distinct class of noncombatants, and the logic of violence employed against them seems to be uniquely motivated by their special role in conflicts.
For practitioners, our results also have important implications. Today, impartiality and neutrality are the most broadly accepted principles governing the provision of humanitarian relief worldwide. And yet, it seems impartiality and neutrality are impossible when humanitarian assistance relieves warring parties of the burdens attached to waging war, often times asymmetrically.
Consistent with this critique, this paper demonstrates that attacks against aid workers cannot simply be explained as random or opportunistic violence. Instead, such violence is often a deliberate strategy employed by combatants to undermine civilian support for the government. The findings 36 ! strongly suggest that the effect of well-intentioned humanitarian assistance may not be benign with respect to the outcome of a civil war.
